US Looks to Japan, South Korea and Turkey to Ease Navy Shipbuilding Crisis

The United States is exploring whether allied shipyards in Japan, South Korea and Turkey could help ease the production bottlenecks facing the U.S. Navy, as Washington looks for ways to expand fleet capacity amid intensifying maritime competition with China.

The discussions reflect a growing concern inside the U.S. defence establishment: America’s naval industrial base is struggling to build ships fast enough. Workforce shortages, aging infrastructure, supply chain weaknesses and delayed construction schedules have left the U.S. Navy searching for new options at a time when China’s shipbuilding capacity continues to grow at a much faster pace.

According to defence reporting and budget documents, the Pentagon is studying a range of allied shipbuilding options. These include the possibility of using Japanese and South Korean shipyards for future frigates or larger surface combatants, as well as discussions with Turkey on ship components, production support and possible frigate-related cooperation.

The Japan and South Korea track appears to be the most advanced in budgetary terms. The U.S. fiscal year 2027 budget proposal includes a $1.85 billion Navy research and development funding line connected to future frigate and larger surface combatant options. While formally described as study funding, officials have indicated that it could support broader procurement planning involving allied shipyards and designs.

South Korea is especially attractive because of its large and modern shipbuilding sector. Companies such as Hanwha Ocean, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Samsung Heavy Industries have the industrial scale, workforce and production methods that the United States lacks in key areas. South Korean shipyards are known for speed, cost efficiency and heavy use of modernized production techniques.

Japan offers a different but equally important model. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Japan Marine United have experience building advanced naval vessels for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Japanese designs such as the Mogami-class frigate have been noted for automation, reduced crew requirements and faster production cycles compared with many Western equivalents.

The U.S. Navy is reportedly looking at allied frigate designs such as Japan’s Mogami class and South Korea’s Daegu class as examples of platforms that could inform future American procurement. Both designs are already in service with close U.S. allies and could potentially be adapted around U.S.-standard combat systems, sensors and weapons.

One concept under discussion would involve allied shipyards building hulls, mechanical systems and electrical structures, while U.S. defence contractors handle combat system integration. This approach would allow Washington to tap foreign production capacity while keeping the most sensitive combat systems under American control.

Turkey has also entered the conversation. Officials cited by Middle East Eye said the United States and Turkey have held talks since last year on naval shipbuilding cooperation. These discussions reportedly included ship components and the possibility that Turkish industry could help the U.S. Navy address production shortfalls.

Turkey’s inclusion is notable because Ankara has developed a mature naval shipbuilding base over the past two decades. Under the MILGEM national warship programme, Turkish shipyards have produced indigenous corvettes and frigates, while Turkish defence firms have exported or supported naval projects for countries including Pakistan. Turkish yards are also capable of working on multiple military and civilian shipbuilding projects at the same time.

A key advantage of Turkey’s naval industry is concentration. Many major shipyards and suppliers are clustered around Istanbul’s Tuzla and Pendik areas and the nearby Yalova region. This creates a dense industrial ecosystem where design teams, shipyards, component suppliers and skilled workers can coordinate quickly.

Turkish shipyards also have experience with distributed production. In some programmes, one yard may produce modules or sections that are later transported to another yard for integration, outfitting, testing and delivery. This collaborative model could be relevant for the United States if cooperation focuses on components, modules or non-sensitive production work rather than full warship construction abroad.

Still, the Turkish track would be politically sensitive. U.S.-Turkey defence relations remain complicated by Ankara’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defence system and the CAATSA sanctions that followed. Any deeper naval industrial cooperation would likely face scrutiny in Congress, even if Turkey remains a NATO ally with a capable maritime industry.

Legal barriers also apply to all three countries. U.S. law generally requires Navy warships to be built in domestic shipyards unless a presidential national security waiver is issued. That means any major foreign-built warship plan would face not only industrial and technical questions, but also legal and political battles in Washington.

Congressional resistance is already visible. Some lawmakers have warned against using foreign workers or foreign yards while American shipbuilders face uncertainty at home. Others are considering restrictions that would prevent defence funds from being used for warships or components produced outside the United States. For them, the answer to the shipbuilding crisis is investment in American yards, not reliance on allied production.

The administration’s counterargument is that allied shipbuilding could serve as a bridge rather than a permanent replacement for U.S. production. Under this model, initial vessels or components could be built abroad while allied companies invest in U.S. shipyards, modernize facilities and eventually shift more production onto American soil.

Hanwha’s acquisition of Philly Shipyard is often cited as an example of this approach. The idea is not simply to buy foreign ships, but to use allied capital, technology and production expertise to rebuild American maritime industrial capacity over time.

The urgency is driven by China. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is already the world’s largest navy by number of vessels, and China’s commercial shipbuilding base gives Beijing a massive industrial foundation for naval expansion. The United States, by contrast, has struggled to deliver major surface combatants and submarines on schedule.

The delays are not theoretical. U.S. destroyer programmes have faced construction delays measured in months or even years, while frigate plans have also encountered setbacks. The cancelled Constellation-class frigate programme has added further pressure to find alternative ways of delivering capable surface combatants.

For Washington, the question is becoming increasingly strategic: can the United States compete with China’s naval buildup if it relies only on its current domestic shipbuilding base? The emerging answer appears to be that allies may have to become part of the solution.

Japan, South Korea and Turkey each offer different forms of capacity. Japan brings advanced naval design and close interoperability with the U.S. Navy. South Korea brings massive industrial scale and modern shipbuilding methods. Turkey brings flexible naval production clusters, MILGEM experience and a growing NATO-linked maritime industrial base.

None of these options is simple. Building U.S. warships abroad would require legal waivers, political support, protection of sensitive technology and careful integration with American combat systems. Even component-level cooperation would need to navigate security controls and Congressional oversight.

But the fact that these options are being studied shows how serious the shipbuilding crisis has become. Washington is no longer treating the problem as a narrow industrial issue. It is looking at the wider allied maritime production base as part of the balance of power with China.

If the U.S. moves forward, it could mark one of the biggest changes in American naval procurement since World War II. Allied shipyards would not replace the U.S. industrial base, but they could become a temporary pressure valve while America tries to rebuild its own capacity.

For Japan, South Korea and Turkey, the opportunity is significant. Participation in U.S. naval production would strengthen their role in allied defence supply chains and could open the door to deeper maritime-industrial cooperation. For the United States, it may be a difficult but necessary admission: in a long naval competition with China, shipbuilding capacity itself has become a strategic weapon.